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In his forthcoming book. The Campo Indian Landfill War: The
Fight for Gold in California's Garbage. Dan McGovern, a former
administrator of the EPA region that includes California. chronicles the
struggle of the Campo tribe to develop a commercial solid waste landfill-
In 1987. when the Campos began to consider developing a com-
nercial landfill on their reservation seventy miles east of San Diego. the
tribe's unemployment rate was 79 percent and most of those who did
have jobs made less than $7.000. In light of the profound poverty of the
Campos. the economc potential of the project is extraordinary. The land-
fill could receive as much as 3.000 tons of waste per day. and given its
capacity of 28 million tons, could continue at that rate for 30 years..
With $3 a ton as its share of the tipping fee, the 300-member tribe could
earn as much as $3 million a year in royalties.
The Campos' neighbors oppose the proposed landfill out of concern
that it might contaminate the aquifer that is the sole source of drinking
water for 400 square miles. Their fears were heightened when EPA noted
that the proposed landfill site may be fatally flawed. Deep fractures--
some of them more than a half-mile in length-criss-cross the bedrock
underlying the site. This might make it impossible. EPA cautioned, for
monitonng wells to detect whether contamination from such common
household hazardous wastes as paint thinner and herbicide was leaking
into the groundwater.
The tribe responds that their neighbors' fears are unfounded
because the tribal environmental protection agency will not permit the
landfill to open unless it can be operated safely. The tribe has formed the
Campo Environmental Protection Agency, enacted the Campo Solid
Waste Management Code, and issued landfill regulations. The regula-
tory program, including the drafting of laws and r gulations by expert
legal and technical consultants, has been subsidized by over a million
dollars in development fees that the tribe has required of the would-be
landfill operator.
After a bruising two-year battle over proposed legislation that
would have asserted state jurisdiction over reervation waste projects, the
Campos entered into a voluntary agreemtent with the state of California.
In reaching that agreement, Secretary lames M. Strock of the California
Environmental Protection Agencq determined that the Campos' regula-
tions governing the design, construction, and operation of the proposed
landfill were -at least as protective, and in some cases more so than
California's. Subsequently, the federal EPA approved the Campos'
landfill regulatory program as meeting or exceeding federal standards..
However. approval of the tribe's regulatory program would not consti-
tute approval of the proposed landfill itself. That decision will be up to
tribal regulators. EPA stressed, because EPA does not have direct per-
milling or enforcement authority over solid waste landfills whether they
are located in states or on reservations.
The two chapters excerpted here place the controversy over the devel-
opment of reservation waste projects in the broader context of the envi-
From The Campo Indian Landfill War, The Fight for Gold in California's
Garbage. by Dan McGovem. Copyright 0 1995 by Dan McGovem. Reprinted
with permission of the University of Oklahoma Press.
Dan McGovern is the former Regional Administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency and is currently a partner with
Landels Ripley and Diamond in San Francisco.
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ronmental justice movement, introduce the protagonists who
have come to personify the Campo conflict, and describe the
action on one of the war's major fronts--the environmental
review process that formed the basis for the interior Secretary's
decision whether to approve the lease of the landfill site.
The Campo Indian Landfill War. The Fight for Gold in
California's Garbage was published this summer by the
University of Oklahoma Press to advance praise by Interior
Secretaries and EPA Administrators who served five presi-
dents.
PROLOGUE
I found Mike Connolly and Donna Tisdale an
odd couple initially. Apparent antagonists. Yet
apparently inseparable. Two moons trapped in the
gravitational field of an unseen planet. What drew
them together?
I encountered Donna and Mike in San Diego at
a community meeting hosted by the Environmental
Health Coalition. I was then the regional adminis-
trator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency-the chief federal environmental
official in EPA's Region 9, which includes Arizona,
California, Hawaii, and Nevada, as well as 139
Indian tribes. (I use the term Indian, rather than
Native American, because in my experience that is
the term they most often use themselves.) The San
Diego meeting was one in a series organized by the
Southwest Network for Environmental and
Economic Justice to give me a better appreciation of
the problems leading many people of color to con-
clude that their communities are victims of environ-
mental racism. The nation's environmental problems
are too often dumped into the backyards of minori-
ty communities, the Southwest Network and like-
minded groups contend, because minorities suffer
from the lingering effects of institutional racism, are
poorer, and wield less political power.
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
Advocates of minority communities are con-
cerned about a variety of environmental health
risks. In the West, one of the primary concerns of
the Latino community is exposure to agricultural
pesticides, because the vast malority of hired farm-
workers are Latinos. For inner-city minority commu-
nities throughout the nation, lead poisoning is a
matter of profound concern. The United States has
not traditionally analyzed its health data by race,
1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Environmental
Equity: Reducing Risk for All Communities, Volume 2: Supporting
Document, 1992, 9-10.
2. U.S. General Accounting Office, Siting of Hazardous Waste
Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial and Economic Staius of
Surrounding Communities, 1983.
making it very difficult to assess the relationship
between race and diseases known to have environ-
mental causes. The notable exception is lead poi-
soning. Here the data are unambiguous: a signifi-
cantly higher percentage of black children than
white children have unacceptably high blood lead
levels, resulting from ingestion of lead-contaminat-
ed dirt and dust, which can lead to permanent intel-
ligence impairment.)
The pioneering studies of environmental
racism involved the relationship between race and
the location of large municipal solid waste landfills,
which we used to call garbage dumps, and haz-
ardous waste landfills. In 1983, District of Columbia
Delegate Walter Fauntroy, who was then chairman
of the Congressional Black Caucus, asked the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) to study haz-
ardous waste landfills in the eight southeastern
states that make up Region 4 of EPA. Although
blacks were only about one-fifth of the population
of Region 4, the GAO found that in three of the four
counties with hazardous waste landfills, the majori-
ty of the people were black.2 In 1987, the role of race
in the siting of commercial waste facilities was stud-
ied on a national scale. In Toxic Wastes and Race, the
United Church of Christ reported that the propor-
tion of racial minorities in communities with the
largest commercial landfills or the greatest number
of commercial waste facilities was three times
greater than in communities without such facili-
ties.3 The evidence that race plays a role in the sit-
ing of waste facilities continues to mount, leading
the Clinton Administration to open investigations,
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, of facility permits
granted by state officials in Louisiana and
Mississippi. 4
The fact that landfills, for example, tend to be
concentrated in minority communities is ultimately
attributable, environmental lustice advocates con-
tend, to racial discrimination. This is the argument
they make: Historically, discrimination in employ-
ment and housing relegated people of color to
poor, segregated communities-ghettoes.
Continued discrimination in housing sales and
rentals, as well as in mortgage financing, makes it
difficult for even the more affluent people of color
to buy their way out of the ghettoes. NIMBYism Is
an acronym of recent coinage, but landfills have
never been popular neighbors. The growing realiza-
tion that the last generation of landfills has proven
3. United Church of Christ, Toxic Wastes and Race In ihe United
States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characieristics
of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites. 1987.
4. John H. Cushman, Jr., "U.S. Weighs Blacks' Complaints
about Pollution," New York Times, November 9, 1993.
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to be a threat to public health, as well as a nui-
sance, has simply stiffened the resolve of residents
around proposed sites-Not in My Backyard. The
NIMBY revolt has made it virtually impossible to
site waste facilities in communities with access to
political power. But minority communities, poor
and excluded from power, do not fare well in NIMBY
competition. Therefore, the waste industry and
local land use agencies have followed the path of
least resistance to the backyards of people of color.
consciously targeting them in at least some cases.
Everybody gets their garbage picked up but only
minority communities get the landfills and inciner-
ators. EPA, environmental justice advocates charge,
has too long deferred to local land use agencies,
refusing to recognize that minority communities are
being discriminated against in fact, if not intention-
ally.
I had understood that the meeting in San Diego
was to focus on the environmental problems of
Barrio Logan. a largely Latino neighborhood of the
city, where zoning practices permit facilities storing
and using hazardous materials, like metal plating
shops, to be located right next to homes. During the
briefing and tour of the community, I became
increasingly perplexed by the presence of Mike
Connolly and Donna Tisdale, because clearly they
were as much strangers to Barrio Logan as I was.
Their principal concern seemed to be chaperoning
me, each making sure that the other didn't have a
moment alone with me.
When we returned to the Environmental Health
Coalition office to discuss what we had seen, I
learned that Mike and Donna were embroiled in a
controversy involving a different community-a
proposal to develop a large commercial solid waste
landfill on the Campo Indian reservation near the
town of Boulevard, in southeastern San Diego
County. At the time of my visit to Barrio Logan,
almost every Indian reservation in the United States
had been approached by at least one waste compa-
ny. In San Diego County, which has more reserva-
tions (eighteen) than any other county in the United
States, three commercial waste projects were under
serious consideration. In addition to the Campo
project, there were proposals for a solid waste land-
fill on the Los Coyotes reservation and a hazardous
waste incinerator on the La Posta reservation,
which adjoins the Campo reservation.
DONNA AND MIKE: ROLE REVERSAL
The Southwest Network for Environmental and
Economic Justice, the Indigenous Environmental
Network, and San Diego County's Coalition for
Indian Rights and its successor California Indians
for Cultural and Environmental Protection. among
other organizations, condemn the targeting of
Indian reservations as an especially insidious form
of environmental racism. Insidious because tribes
are being asked-for a price-to accept waste pro-
jects nobody else wants. Why would Indian tribes
agree to projects that other poor minority commu-
nities reject? The answer lies in the quasi-sovereign
character of Indian reservations, and the fact that
reservation land is held in common by the members
of the tribe.
When a landfill is proposed fora black or Latino
community, for example, the community may rea-
sonably anticipate little but grief. Unlike an Indian
tribe, a Latino or black community will not own the
proposed site of the waste project. Therefore, the
minority community will not share in the proceeds
of the sale or lease of the site. Someone may get
rich, possibly even a black or Latino someone, but
not the minority community as a whole. Admittedly.
the county in which the minority community is
located will profit from the contribution the pro-
posed facility will make to its tax base, if the project
is' a private venture. However, the county officials
may not-almost assuredly will not. environmental
justice advocates would contend-invest the addi-
tional tax revenues in the minority community.
Finally, the jobs created by the project will not nec-
essarily be filled by members of the minority com-
munity. Because they foresee suffering all of the
burdens and receiving few of the benefits, black and
Latino communities confronting waste projects are
increasingly of one mind-Not in Our Backyard.
The situation is different with tribes. Because
reservation land is held in common by tribal mem-
bers, the proceeds derived from the lease of their
land for a waste project will accrue to the entire
tribe, to be distributed per capita or invested in trib-
al projects such as subsidized housing or other eco-
nomic development ventures. The tribe can insist
upon preference in hiring, so that jobs created by
the project will be available to tribal members.
How powerful the incentives are depends on
the size of the pie and the number of slices. If a tribe
has thousands of members, the slices may be too
thin to provide much of an incentive. For example.
the eighteen-thousand-member Rosebud Sioux
tribe was guaranteed preference for the sixty to one
hundred jobs that the developer claimed would be
created by a proposed landfill project on their reser-
vation. "How dumb do they think we are?" com-
mented a tribal member who opposed the project.
"They say we have 85 percent unemployment. So we
Faq11995 Ra C=O bdl.'M LUM Wer
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get a megadump and what do we have? 84.5 per-
cent."5 However, if the tribe has three hundred
members, like the Campo, or fifteen, like the La
Posta, the incentives become proportionately
greater.
Although I was familiar with the terms of the
debate over reservation waste projects, I was sur-
prised not only by the arguments made that day in
San Diego but also by the identity of the advocates.
The Southwest Network for Environmental and
Economic Justice is a coalition of grassroots groups
representing minority communities. Therefore,
since the Southwest Network had organized the
meeting, I expected the argument against the
Campo project to be made by an Indian, perhaps by
a Campo. I had attended a meeting in Arizona some
weeks earlier where a young Havasupai Indian
woman, a member of the Southwest Network, had
asked EPA to stop a uranium mining project on the
rim of the. Grand Canyon that she argued would
contaminate the Havasupais' water supply, as well
as violate their religious tenets concerning the
sacredness of what non-Indians- refer to as the envi-
ronment.
However, Donna Tisdale, who is white, turned
out to be the person speaking against the landfill.
Moreover, Donna became involved in the Campo
controversy not because she had previously been
active in the environmental justice movement but
because the project would be, almost literally, in
her backyard. The reservation boundary and the
proposed landfill site are lust over the rise from the
ranch belonging to Donna and her husband Ed.
Donna is convinced that the landfill will inevitably
leak and contaminate their water supply. Donna
and Backcountry Against Dumps (BAD), the grass-
roots group she organized among her mostly white
neighbors, were in the midst of a legislative battle
to kill the Campo project by making it unlawful to
deliver waste to a facility not licensed by the state.
Mike Connolly (Misquish) is a member of the
Campo tribe. As the chairman of the Campo
Environmental Protection Agency, Mike is careful
not to become an advocate for the project he is
responsible for regulating. However, he vehemently
rejects assertions by non-Indians-be they white
ranchers, white mainstream environmentalists, or
minority environmental justice advocates-that it
is "un-Indian" to consider commercial waste facili-
ties as economic development projects. What is at
stake, Mike contends, is the very survival of a peo-
ple. No one wants to live next to a landfill. Neither
do the Campos. If they had viable economic devel-
5. Mary Hager, "Dances with Garbage," Newsweek, April 29,
opment alternatives, they would not have undertak-
en the project. But they do not have such alterna-
tives, he insists.
After my initial meeting with Mike and Donna in
San Diego, I dealt with the Campo project frequent-
ly during the remaining months of my tenure as
regional administrator. I remain troubled by the
case. That is why I have written this book-to try to
sort out my thoughts. And perhaps help my friends
in the environmental justice movement to sort out
their own, for I sense that they don't know what to
make of the Campo case. The movement is clearly
uncomfortable with a white like Donna who attacks
the right of Indians to decide whether to have waste
projects on their reservations. But it seems just as
uncomfortable with an Indian like Mike who says
that a decision in favor of a waste project may be
the right choice, under the right conditions,
Mike and Donna have been generous in sharing
their files, their thoughts, and their feelings with
me. I have come to admire both of them; they are as
indefatigable and as effective a pair of advocates as
I have ever met. I am in the uncomfortable position
of having become a friend to people who are ene-
mies to one another. They have chosen sides, and I
have tried not to. I suspect that nothing I say in this
book will please both of them. If neither will admit
the justice of my portrayal of the other's position, I
hope that they will at least find that I have present-
ed their own views honestly and sympathetically.
CONSIDERING THE CONSEOUENCES
Because reservation land is legally considered
to be held in trust by the federal government for the
benefit of a tribe, the proposed lease of the Campo
site to Mid-American required the approval of the
Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs,
And because this landfill project was a political
landmine, the question of approving the lease was
ultimately decided by the Secretary of Interior him-
self. In the end, each side would use the access and
exercise the influence at its disposal to win the sec-
retary's heart and mind. Initially, however, because
of the National Environmental Policy Act, the con-
test had to be waged in the open, in a process that
guarantees the public an opportunity to partici-
pate-an environmental impact study that would
serve as the basis for the secretary's decision.
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), any federal agency proposing a major pro-
Volm 3, Nurter1Don McGovem
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ject that may significantly affect the environment
must disclose to the public the possible environ-
mental effects of the project. The environmental
impact statement (EIS) must also discuss alterna-
tives to the proposed prolect that could reduce or
eliminate any adverse environmental consequences
it might have. It must be emphasized that NEPA is
procedural, not substantive. That is, although NEPA
requires an agency to consider alternatives to its
proposed project, the statute does not require the
agency to pick the least environmentally damaging
alternative. The rationale of NEPA is that the
process of examining a proposed action and its
alternatives in a public forum will lead to better
decisions by the federal agency.
Congress gave EPA a watchdog role under
NEPA, directing EPA to review and comment upon
the environmental effects of major actions pro-
posed by other federal agencies. Some would say
that EPA is a toothless watchdog, because EPA can-
not require another agency to choose the least envi-
ronmentally damaging alternative to its proposed
project, nor even require it to prepare an environ-
mental impact statement on the project. EPA can
refer questions of NEPA compliance to the
President's Council on Environmental Quality
(CEO), which is responsible for resolving inter-
agency disputes concerning the implementation of
NEPA_ However, if EPA is toothless, so is CEO,
because CEO also lacks authority to require federal
agencies to comply with its rulings. Ultimately.
EPA's role under NEPA is hortatory, encouraging
other federal agencies to prepare honest environ-
mental impact statements, and EPA's authority is
limited to the persuasive force of its comments and
its consequent ability to leverage the power of
informed public opinion. There are cases, of course,
where EPA has regulatory authority independent of
its role under NEPA. The limits of EPA's regulatory
authority over municipal solid waste landfills were
outlined in chapter two, and will be discussed fur-
ther in chapter ten.
Some federal agencies have come to terms with
NEPA because it has become so clear (although lit-
igation may well have served as the clarifying agent)
that their actions have significant environmental
consequences-for example, lease sales by the
Interior Department's Minerals Management
Service for oil wells off the California coast, adop-
tion by the National Park Service of a new manage-
ment plan for Yosemite National Park, or incinera-
tion by the U.S. Army of chemical weapons stored
on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. EPA's role in
I. Assoaated Press, Utilities' Merger Plan Hits Setback,
San Francsco Chronicle, February 2, 1991 Greg Johnson, "Ruling
reviewing the environmental impacts of such
actions is accepted, even if its specific comments
are sometimes unwelcome.
In other arenas, the importance of NEPA com-
pliance and the legitimacy of EPA's role under
NEPA is still contested. An agency or the con-
stituency it serves will contend that environmental
considerations should not drive the agency's deci-
sions, permitting that to happen, the argument
goes, would be to let the tail wag the dog. For exam-
ple, the appropriateness of EPA's commenting
under NEPA upon the environmental effects of
mergers has been questioned. In EPA's Region 9.
which I headed, one of the contexts in which that
question arose was the proposed merger of electri-
cal utility companies in southern California. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the
California Public Utilities Commission were consid-
ering a merger application filed by Southern
California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric
Company.
The stakes were high: the surviving utility,
Southern California Edison. would have been the
nation's largest investor-owned electrical utility,
with 4.8 million customers; Edison asserted that
efficiencies made possible by the merger would
result in $1.7 billion in cost savings that would be
passed through to utility customers; and before it-
was over the two utilities would report spending $87
million in their attempt to win regulatory and leg-
islative approval at local, state, and federal levels
for the proposed merger.i
Commenting upon such a controversial project
places EPA in a very vdlnerable position. One of the
risks is that EPAs comments will be seized upon by
project opponents, whose opposition may spring
from entirely different considerations. For example,
the opposition of the mayor of San Diego and utili-
ty consumer groups to the proposed merger of
Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas &
Electric was not motivated by environmental con-
siderations, but doubtless they welcomed the fact
that the utilities would have to fight on yet another
front. It is a natural human reaction for the propo-
nents of a project, having been beaten about the
heads and shoulders with a stick provided by EPA.
to lump the agency in with their other tormenters.
And, frankly. EPA doesn't need more enemies.
Unlike other federal agencies-the Department of
Agriculture, for instance-EPA has no natural con-
stituency. Certainly the regulated community does
not lobby Congress to increase EPA's budget or reg-
ulatory reach. And the environmental community
Resurrects Issue of SDG&E's Competitiveness.' Lcs Anges Tim.
February 5, 1991.
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seems to feel that EPA, under any administration,
will respond only to sticks, not to carrots. Be that as
it may, Region 9 did comment on the likely environ-
mental consequences of the proposed merger.
One of the efficiencies claimed for the propos-
al was that electrical energy production could be
shifted from San Diego to newer, more efficient
plants near Los Angeles. That was precisely what
caused EPA concern. Region 9 pointed out that the
shift in power production to the Los Angeles area
threatened to increase significantly emissions there
of nitrogen oxide, a precursor of smog. This in the
region with the worst air quality in the nation.2 A
federal administrative law judge shared EPA's con-
cern, recommending that the merger be prohibited
on the ground that it would further degrade air
quality in southern California, as well as stifle com-
petition and generate few benefits for utility cus-
tomers. Before the federal energy commission acted
on the judge's recommendation, the state utilities
commission rejected the merger, leading the utili-
ties to withdraw their application to the federal
agency.3
SURGERY ON MOTHER EARTH:
NEPA AND INFORMED CONSENT
A landfill may significantly affect the environ-
ment. Indeed, as BAD claims, the adverse environ-
mental consequences of an ill-considered landfill
project may be devastating and irreversible.
Therefore, under NEPA an EIS is required for the
approval of a lease of reservation land for a com-
mercial landfill, and given the BIA's fiduciary
responsibility to tribes, one would expect it to com-
ply with NEPA as a matter of course. Such expecta-
tions have been disappointed before, however,
because of the BIA's conflicting missions.
As indicated, EPA makes enemies in carrying
out its statutory responsibility to review environ-
mental impact statements, and the agency does not
need any more enemies. In practice, the NEPA
process is even more stressful for the lead agency,
the agency whose contemplated action is being
reviewed, than it is for EPA. The federal Bureau of
Reclamation, for example, traditionally regarded
the NEPA process as an impediment to the accom-
plishment of its primary mission-building dams-
and it was not career-enhancing for the bureau's
environmental staff to be perceived by their superi-
ors as being part of the NEPA problem. EPA, by con-
trast, has the advantage of a unified mission pro-
tecting human health and the environment.
Admittedly, long before James Carville made it
a mantra for the Clinton campaign, every cabinet-
level official in the Reagan and Bush
Administrations knew that his or her other priority
had to be "the economy, stupid." Indeed, while
William Reilly was contemplating an offer to join
the Bush Administration, one of his predecessors In
office warned him that being EPA administrator In a
recession would be no prize. And the pressure to
consider jobs as well as the environment is
inevitably felt by rank-and-file EPA employees just
as by political appointees.
Nevertheless, for the BIA the preparation of an
environmental impact statement on an economic
development project can be especially traumatic
because the agency has trust responsibilities both
to protect the reservation environment and to pro-
mote tribal economic development. The latter
responsibility was underlined during the Reagan
Administration with the issuance of an Indian
Policy Statement, the goals of which are recited in
the environmental impact statement prepared for
the Campo project:
This Administration intends to remove
the impediments to economic development
and to encourage cooperative efforts among
tribes, the federal government, and the pri-
vate sector in developing reservation
economies.
Growing economies provide jobs, pro-
mote self-sufficiency, and provide revenue
for essential services.
The federal government's responsibility
should not be used to hinder tribes from tak-
ing advantage of economic development
opportunities.
It is the policy of this Administration to
encourage private involvement, both Indian
and non-Indian, in tribal economic develop-
ment.
4
The conflict within the BIA between promoting
development and protecting the environment came
to a head in an unlikely place--the tiny Cortina
reservation, Just one mile square, of the Wintun
2. Jacqueline Wyland, Chief. Office of Federal Activities, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. Region 9, Letter to Secretary
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, December 26,
1989.
3. Greg Johnson, "Judge Urges U.S. Not to OK Merger of
Utilities." Los Angeles Times: San Francisco Chronicle, "State Rejects
Huge Utility Merger," May 9. 1991.
4. U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Sacramento Area Office, Campo Solid Waste Management Project,
Final Environmental Impact Statement, FES 92-29, vol. 1,
November 1992, 1-5.
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Indians, about 120 miles north of San Francisco.
National Environmental Corporation had contracts
to dispose of building-rehabilitation waste contain-
ing asbestos. Such material is considered haz-
ardous waste by the state of California, but is sub-
ject to less stringent regulation by the federal gov-
ernment; this made it less expensive to dispose of
the material on an Indian reservation insofar as
reservations are subject to federal but not state reg-
ulations. The tribal president, Mary Norton, sup-
ported the project. Norton did not live on the reser-
vation. Tribal members who did--including Norton's
daughter, Carmeno Bill--vehemently opposed the
project and felt terribly threatened by potential
exposure to asbestos.
Subjected to considerable pressure to hurry
through the environmental review process, the local
office of the BIA contented itself with an environmen-
tal assessment, which is a much less rigorous study
than an environmental impact statement. On the
basis of'the environmental assessment, the local
BIA office issued a "Finding of no significant impact"
(FONSI), NEPA terminology for the conclusion that
the potential environmental impacts of a project are
so negligible that an EIS is not warranted. Cortina
members wrote to the district BIA superintendent,
complaining that the agency had not complied with
NEPA.5
Don Knapp is a natural resource specialist with
the regional office of the BIA in Sacramento whose
duties include the review of FONSI's prepared by
the local BIA offices. On this occasion, according to
Knapp, the local office had issued the FONSI "boom
out with it and sent us an information copy." The
regional office overruled the FONSI. "The more we
looked," says Knapp, "the worse it got. Can of
worms. We wrote a huge, major report on it [to BIA
headquartersl. Thirteen pages of things that were
wrong and not done right that [the companyl said
they were going to do."6
Eventually, the asbestos really hit the fan.
During the summer, Carmeno Bill complained that
National Environmental was improperly disposing
of the asbestos waste, simply dumping bags of it in
a ravine, a charge the lawyer representing the tribe
denied.7 On December 6, 1988, Bill told the Colusa
Sun Herald that torn bags of asbestos waste were
exposed to the elements on the reservation, and
that heavy equipment used by National
Environmental was contaminated with asbestos,
spreading the contamination on and off the reser-
vation. Bill complained that her family and others
on the reservation had already begun to suffer from
symptoms of asbestos exposure. She added that
the tribe's spiritual ground had been contaminated
with asbestos, preventing Bill and her family from
visiting the site to do honor to a nephew who had
died recently. Bill phoned BIA and other federal
agencies from the Sun Herald office, but received
no help. Again the tribal lawyer dismissed Bill's
charges, characterizing them as "wild hallucina-
tions."8
The next day Carmeno Bill. her sixteen-year-old
son. and her fourteen-year-old daughter were
arrested on the reservation after they confronted
two men who were about to use the heavy equip-
ment that Bill believed to be contaminated with
asbestos. The sheriff's office gave the Colusa Sun
Herald the following account of the alleged incident:
Bill told her daughter to get an ax and use it on a
car. which "obediently, she did," inflicting three
hundred dollars' worth of damage to a 1979 Cadillac
that apparently belonged to one of the men. Then
Bill told her son to get a shotgun; the shotgun was
fired into the air several times, although no one was
injured. The arresting officers took Bill to a hospital
because she had gone into a trance and could not
be awakened.9 Because of the controversy the tribe
and the company agreed to close the landfill.
Martin Topper, EPA's national Indian coordina-
tor. had been one of the federal officials receiving
Carmeno Bill's increasingly frantic phone calls. In
the wake of the incident. Topper told George Farris,
his contact in BIA headquarters, that this sort of
thing could not be permitted to happen again.
There had to be a more open process that guaran-
teed public participation-the process involved in
an EIS. In the meantime, Farris had been getting the
same message from the BI's regional office in
Sacramento. Believing that "political decisions had
been made and anticipating that the region's deci-
sion to overrule the FONSI would be appealed to
Washington. Don Knapp and the regional director
had urged BA headquarters to adopt a consistent
policy requiring the preparation of an EIS in cases
like Cortina. Knapp says the region sought the
directive "to slow these things down, they were
being ramrodded, just like that one was, shoved
5. Colusa (Calf.) Sun Herald. "BIA Okays Asbestos, July 19,
1988; lane Ellis, "Indians Protest,' Colusa (Calif.) Sun Herald,
September 23. 1988.
6. Don Knapp. Interview by author. September 3. 1993.
7. Jane Ellis. "Asbestos Dump Defended." Colusa (Calif.) Sun
Herald. August 11.1988.
8. lane Ellis. 'Cortina Secretary Claims Illegal Asbestos
Movng. Cefusa (Ca[f.) Sun Heratl. December 6, 1988.
9. lane Ellis. -Bill. Children failed for Asbestos-Related
Fracas on Rancheda: cc!usa (CaU.) Sun HeraU. December 7, 1938.
10. Martin Topper. Interew by author. August 31, 1993;
Don Knapp. Interview by author. September 3. 1993.
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down our throat." 0
This was an unusual alignment of the planets,
with the BIA regional office lining up with EPA
headquarters. It exerted sufficient gravitational pull
to elicit the policy that governed the Campo case--
that an EIS is required as a matter of course for a
commercial landfill project on a reservation. EPA's
Topper likens the process to the informed consent
that should be obtained before major surgery.
Surgery is an assault on the body for therapeutic
purposes. An informed patient can make a rational
decision as to whether the prospective benefits of
surgery outweigh the adverse consequences that
may ensue. Often referred to by tribal environmen-
tal activists as raping Mother Earth, a landfill pro-
ject is, indeed, an assault upon the land. In order to
make a responsible decision as to whether the
prospective benefits of such a project outweigh the
possible adverse environmental consequences, the
tribe needs the information that would be devel-
oped in an EIS.
THE CAMPO EIS
The government agencies, nonprofit organiza-
tions, and private citizens who commented on the
Campo EIS raised a wide variety of concerns: the
alleged lack of demand for additional landfill capac-
ity in San Diego County; the effect of the project on
the value of surrounding properties; the possibility
that earthquakes might lead to a catastrophic fail-
ure of the containment systems; and the litter,
noise, traffic congestion, and air pollution that the
project might generate.
The comments ranged from the ethereal to the
earthy. The San Diego Astronomy Association, a
nonprofit educational organization whose observa-
tory is within two miles of the project site,
expressed concern that landfill operations would
raise dust, which would scatter light, degrading
viewing conditions at "one of the finest locations for
observational astronomy on the North American
continent."' I One BAD supporter eschewed techni-
cal comments, simply characterizing the two-vol-
ume draft EIS as an "abhorrent waste of tax-payer
monies by the leeches of society representing a
bloated bureaucracy."12
The unifying themes of the critical comments
were an overriding concern with the possibility of
groundwater contamination, a distrust of govern-
ment, and a defiant resolve to stop the project. A
Boulevard resident addressed an open letter to "all
the 'BIG WHEELERS' and 'DEALERS' who have
been lying to us" concerning the project. "This is the
only water and air we've had, have, or ever will have
out here," he wrote. "We've worked all our lives for
what we have, and we are not going to 'roll over' at
the 'whim' of some 'self-important, arrogant' people
or companies with a great deal of money to buy 'boot-
lickers."13
Donna Tisdale's mastery of the EIS process
would be the envy of any environmental lawyer.
BAD submitted lengthy comments on every aspect
of the EIS and coordinated with other organizations
submitting comments. Donna testified at all three
of the public hearings held on the EIS by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, and at times almost seemed to
function as the hearing officer as she orchestrated
the order of witnesses and asked the forbearance of
the more unruly of her supporters. Nevertheless,
Donna seemed no more inclined than other BAD
members to trust the system she had mastered or
to accept its outcome if it were adverse to her cause.
"I have also heard that Ron Jaeger, the California
Director of B.I.A., has called me a troublemaker,"
she testified at one of the hearings. "And in defense,
well, I could be. lust don't cross me. All we're trying
to do is cooperate with the system. And if the sys-
tem doesn't work, then we will be troublemakers," 14
By far the most serious concern raised by BAD
is the possibility of groundwater contamination.
Just how high the stakes are for Donna and her
neighbors was established in a separate adminis-
trative proceeding. Under a provision of the federal
Safe Drinking Water Act, BAD submitted a petition
asking EPA's Region 9 to determine that the pro-
posed landfill would be located above an aquifer
that is the "sole source" of drinking water in the
vicinity.
At the public hearing conducted by EPA, the
supporters of BAD again expressed a sense of alien-
ation from government, with one witness declaim-
ing: "This is the age of Ross Perot. This is the grass
roots people that are fed up with you politicians
telling us how it's going to be. We're tired of you
stickin' shit down our throat. We ain't havin' it any-
more. You know, people are rising up and we're
throwing you out of office. If you don't start wisin'
up and doin' what the people want, you're histo-
ry."15
After reviewing hydrogeological studies of the
iI. Campo Solid Wasie Management Project, Final EIS. vol. 2,
D345-D346
12. Campo Solid Waste Management Project, Final EIS. vol. 2, E5.
13. Campo Solid Waste Management Projeci, Final EIS, vol. 2, E24.
14. Campo Solid Waste Management Project, Final EIS, vol. 2,
Testimony of Donna Tisdale. Fl 16.
15. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9, Public
Heanng: CampolCottonwood Creek Sole Source Aquiler Pelilion,
Transcnpt of Testimony, Pine Valley, California, July 9, 1992, 136.
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area, Region 9 determined that the Campo/
Cottonwood Creek aquifer does meet the statutory
criteria for designation as a sole source aquifer: the
people in a four-hundred-square-mile area draw
almost all of their drinking water from domestic
wells tapping into the aquifer. Economically feasi-
ble alternative sources of drinking water are not
available. Building a pipeline to the isolated.
sparsely populated area would be prohibitively
expensive; a comparable project in San Diego
County a decade earlier had cost approximately
$170 million. Moreover, the exploding population
of southern California has long since outstripped
the water supply; the water supply agencies serving
San Diego County would not be willing to annex the
area. In the absence of practicable alternative
sources of drinking water, contamination of the
aquifer would create a significant hazard to public
health. 6
As Donna had understood it would be, the sole
source aquifer designation was largely a symbolic
victory for BAD. Under the federal Safe Drinking
Water Act, the practical effect of a designation is
that federal financial assistance is not available to a.
project that the EPA administrator determines may
contaminate a sole source aquifer. However, the
Campo land fill project is not federally financed.
Therefore, the designation gave EPA no additional
leverage.
OF OPEN DUMPS, DRIP COFFEE MAKERS,
AND WITCHES' BREW
A facility of the sort proposed by the Campos is
known as a municipal solid ,aste landfill. The change in
terminology reflects more than an exercise in
euphemism. The open durpps in which most United
States waste was deposited until recently lacked
important pollution controls that are incorporated
into many modem landfills.
One of the most common pollution problems
associated with an open dump is that rainwater
seeping through the garbage may contaminate the
groundwater underneath the dump, with a poiso-
nous plume of contaminated leachate possibly
spreading well beyond the boundaries of the facili-
ty. The formation of leachate can be illustrated by
comparing an open dump with a drip coffee maker.
The dry coffee is the garbage, the water poured into
the top is rainwater, and the dark, brewed coffee
dripping out of the bottom is leachate.i7 Leachate is
a witch's brew because the waste through which it
percolates is laced with toxic substances.
Unlike dumps, which accepted industrial waste
as well as municipal garbage, modem municipal
landfills do not accept hazardous waste, as such.
The major source of potential contamination in the
waste that would be accepted by the Campo landfill
is household hazardous waste. There is no standard
definition of this term. However, household hazardous
waste is generally understood to include such com-
mon items as home maintenance products (e.g.,
paint, paint thinner, stain, varnish, and glue) and
yard- maintenance products (e.g., pesticides, insec-
ticides, and herbicides). In most cases these prod-
ucts are not hazardous while in storage, or during
use if properly handled, but they release potentially
toxic substances after they have been discarded.
More than one hundred substances listed as haz-
ardous under the federal Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act are present in household prod-
ucts, including metals (e.g., mercury, lead, and sil-
ver) and organic chemicals (e.g., trichlorethylene.
benzene, toluene, and parathion).
The United States Congress' Office of
Technology Assessment summarized a number of
studies of the household hazardous waste compo-
nent of municipal solid waste. In two communities-
-New Orleans and California's Marin County-the
household hazardous waste was sorted out of the
trash from single-family dwellings and weighed.
Between 0.35 and 0.40 percent of the total munici-
pal solid waste was considered hazardous, and each
household threw away an average of fifty to sixty
grams (approximately two ounces) of household
hazardous waste each week. Other studies in
Albuquerque and the Puget Sound area in
Washington reached similar conclusions: In gener-
al, household hazardous waste comprises less than
one percent of municipal solid waste.
Data from other communities indicated that
the hazardous constituents themselves were pre-
sent in even lower quantities--less than 0.2 per-
cent.iB Assume for the sake of argument that 0.2
percent is the correct figure. There would still be
ample cause for concern, for if the Campo landfill
were to accept waste at the projected rate of 3,000
tons per day, it would receive 12,000 pounds of
household hazardous waste each day.
THE CAMPO DESIGN EXCEEDS
STATE AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
The Campos do not deny that household haz-
16. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Region 9. Sc!e
Source Aquifer Detenmnation: CampolCottonwool Creek Aquifer. San Dlega
County, California, May 5. 1993.
17. Rachel's Hazardous Waste News. "Leachate Collection
Systems. The Achilles" Heel of Landfills: no. 119. March 7. 1939.
18. U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, Facing
Ameda's Trash: VJF.ta Net fr Muno;,pl S::i Waste. OTA-0-424.
October 1989.86-87.
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ardous waste leaching from a landfill can pose a
serious threat of ground water contamination. The
Campos contend, however, that their facility would
not pose such a threat because the design specifi-
cations of the landfill regulations the tribe has
adopted are more protective than the standards
required by either the federal government or the
state of California. To explain the design features of
the proposed Campo facility, we shall return to the
comparison of an open landfill with a drip coffee
maker. Again, the dry coffee is garbage, the water
poured into the top of the coffee maker is rainwater,
and the brewed coffee dripping out the bottom is
leachate. A modern landfill might be described as a
kind of anti-coffee maker. That is, there is a "lid" on
the top of a modern landfill to prevent the infiltra-
tion of moisture into the garbage, and one or more
liners on the bottom to prevent the escape of any
leachate that does form. The design of the Campo
landfill incorporates both of these features. It would
have a cover to prevent rainwater from eptering the
landfill and forming leachate, and it would have a
double liner and leachate collection system.
The final cover over the landfill would be eight
feet thick. There would be three feet of soil over the
waste, including twelve inches of low-permeability
soil. That layer of soil would be covered by a 40-mil
synthetic liner. (By comparison, the "commercial
strength" lawn bags one buys at the grocery store
are 1.4 mil thick.) The liner, in turn, would be cov-
ered by another five feet of soil.
There would be two liner systems underneath the
waste. The primary liner system is intended to col-
lect any leachate that forms in the landfill. The pri-
mary liner would be a 60-mil high-density polyeth-
ylene. The leachate collection system above the pri-
mary liner would consist of twelve inches of gravel
containing six-inch perforated collection pipes. A
two-foot layer of soil would be placed above the
gravel to protect the collection system and primary
liner from the overlying waste. The secondary liner
system is intended to detect and remove any
leachate that migrates through the primary liner
system. Leachate from both, collection systems
would drain to sumps; when the sumps were full,
the leachate would be tested to determine whether
it was hazardous and it would then be disposed of
appropriately.' 9
The importance of these design features should
not be underestimated. When the Campo project
19. U.S. Department of Intenor, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Sacramento Area Office, Campo Solid Waste Management Project,
Record of Decision, FES 92-29. April 27. 1993. 5; Campo Solid Waste
Management Project, Final EIS vol. 1. 2-8.
20. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Facing
Amenca's Trash, 278. 281. 284.
was announced, only one percent of existing land-
fills had synthetic liners to prevent the escape of
leachate, and only eleven percent had systems to
collect and remove leachate. In the absence of such
safeguards, it is not surprising that 184 municipal
landfills had by 1986 made the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund list
of the most contaminated sites in the nation. 20 Nor
is it surprising, though it is tragically ironic, that the
legacy of contamination at older landfills has made
it next to impossible to gain community acceptance
for proposals to open new, safer facilities.
Some critics believe that modern landfills that
comply with the latest federal requirements still
pose an unacceptable risk of groundwater pollution.
They point out that landfill covers may deteriorate:
that synthetic liners are not perfectly impermeable
and may be defectively manufactured or improperly
glued at the seams; and that leachate collection
systems may become clogged with silt or microor-
ganisms, corroded by chemicals in the leachate, or
simply smashed by the tons of overlying waste.2
For those of us who are not scientists or engi-
neers, the difficulty of maintaining landfill covers
may be more easily understood than the problems
associated with landfill liners or leachate collection
systems. Because a landfill cap is designed to be
relatively impermeable, rain will run off it at a veloc-
ity determined by the quantity of the rain and the
slope of the cap. Unfortunately, some of the cap soil
may be carried away with the runoff, contributing to
sheet and rill erosion, and, ultimately, gullying of
the cap. Moreover, as the soil dries, cracks will form.
Subsequent rains will penetrate the cracks. In win-
ter, moisture in the cracks may freeze and expand,
widening the cracks. To minimize rain and wind ero-
sion, vegetation may be planted. However, as the
roots of the plants penetrate the cap, they may
compromise its physical integrity. Moreover, plants
provide cover and food for burrowing animals. One
study revealed that mice, shrews, and pocket
gophers can move 10,688 pounds of soil to the sur-
face per acre per year. Earthworms alone can have a
substantial impact, passing from two to fifteen tons
of soil through their digestive tracts per acre per
year. The holes left as earthworms move through
the soil increase water infiltration.
Writing in the industry publication Waste Age,
David 1. Johnson of Michigan State University
observes: "At this point, you may well say, 'If we
21. Rachel's Hazardous Waste News, "The Catch-22s of Landfill
Design," no. 109, December 26. 1988; Rachel's Hazardous Waste
News, 'Analyzing Why All Landfills Leak," no. 116. February 14,
1989; Rachel's Hazardous Waste News, "Leachate Collection Systems:
The Achilles' Heel of Landfills."
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plant, we're encouraging plant and animal penetra-
tion of the clay cap. If we don't plant, we get erosion
or freeze-thaw destruction of the cap.'"
"Unfortunately," Johnson points out, "that is one of
the fundamental dilemmas left us by the normal
processes of change in the natural world, be they the
progressive conversion of a grassy field to a forest or
the utilization of cracks in concrete sidewalks by ants
and dandelions. This same successional develop-
ment process," Johnson concludes, "will detnmen-
tally affect long-term landfill cap integrity."22
Potential problems with the landfill cover, lin-
ers, and leachate collection systems were raised by
some of the organizations and individuals who
commented upon the draft environmental impact
statement. The final environmental impact state-
ment included responses to comments raising such
concerns. For example, penetration of the landfill
cap by roots or burrowing animals was acknowl-
edged to be a "serious concern." To address the
concern, Campo EPA regulations require that the
vegetation growing on the landfill be of a type hav-
ing roots "no deeper than the top layer of cover soil,
and that the soil be deep enough to prevent pene-
tration of the cap by burrowing animals." For this
reason, the response explained, Campo EPA had
decided to require that the top layer of soil be five
feet deep, rather than the two-foot depth originally
proposed.23 As for the liners, the response to com-
ments stated that appropriate quality control/qual-
ity assurance measures would be taken during the
manufacture and installation of the liners to ensure
their integrity. For instance all the seams in a liner
would be field tested and a certain number of the
seams would be laboratory tested.24 Turning to the
leachate collection systems, the response to com-
ments indicated that, for example, clogging would
be prevented by flushing the systems periodically.2'
The Campo landfill would be significantly safer,
the final environmental impact statement conclud-
ed, than a landfill satisfying minimum federal
design criteria, which require less durable covers
and specify single-liner rather th'an double-liner
containment systems. The probability of a failure in
one or more cells of the Campo landfill was ana-
lyzed. A failure was defined as a breach of all lines
of defense. In the case of the Campo landfill, this
would mean. simultaneously, failure of the final
cover, which would permit rainwater to enter the
landfill and migrate through the waste; failure of the
leachate collection and removal system. failure of
the primary liner; failure of the leak detection sys-
tem; failure of the secondary liner; and failure of the
low-permeability soil underlying the secondary
liner. Failure of less than all of these components
within a single phase of the landfill was not consid-
ered likely to result in release of leachate from the
landfill.
The cumulative probability of a failure of a
landfill meeting the minimum federal design crite-
ria is about 70 percent over a period of 150 years,
according to the final environmental impact state-
ment, whereas the cumulative probability of a fail-
ure of a landfill of the Campo design is only 3 per-
cent over the same time period. "In terms of relia-
bility, this means that the proposed Campo design
is 97 percent reliable when considered over the time
penod that includes 30 years of operation, 30 years
of post-closure maintenance, and 90 years of no
activity.... At 100 years after startup, the proposed
Campo design is expected to be 99.8 percent reli-
able. compared to a reliability of 78 percent for a
federally compliant design. 26
BUT IS THE SITE FATALLY FLAWED?
Though a landfill of the Campo design may be
significantly less likely to experience a failure than a
landfill merely meeting minimum federal design cri-
teria, the Campo landfill would still be required by
EPA's municipal solid waste landfill regulations to
have a system of wells to monitor whether contam-
inated leachate is escaping into the groundwater.
If there is a fatal flaw in the proposed Campo
landfill, it inheres in the nature of the rock underlying
the project site. There are two types of rock, differen-
tiated by their degree of weathering and decomposi-
tion. Weathered and highly decomposed bedrock
extends to a maximum depth of 110 feet beneath the
surface of the proposed facility. The weathered
bedrock is soft and crumbles easily. Unweathered
bedrock, which is resistant to the blows of a hammer.
lies beneath the weathered bedrock.
It is the unweathered bedrock that is the cause
of concern. It is igneous rock-that is, it was formed
by the cooling and consolidation of magma.
Igneous rocks tend to form fracture systems as they
cool or react to other geologic forces. These fracture
systems serve as conduits for groundwater while
making it difficult, perhaps impracticable, to moni-
tor its movement and quality.
22. David 1. lohnson. 'Caps: The Long Haul.' %aste Age.
March 1986. 83. 89; Rachel's Hazardous %,aste Nws. "The Catch 22s
of Landfill Design.
23. Campo Solid Waste Management Projet. Final EIS, vol. 1. D-
3 to D-4.
24. Canp Sc l %'taste Mana;ern PK=et. Final EIS., vol. 1. D-55.
25. Camp Sc Waste Minam..mi PKect. Final EIS, vol. i, D-1 1.
26. Campi SCUI Waste ?..anagvmaen Project. Final EIS. vol. 1. S-5
to S-6, 2-4.
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Under EPA's regulations, the system of moni-
toring wells surrounding a landfill must be ade-
quate to detect whether the groundwater passing
underneath the landfill is becoming contaminated.
When the regulations were proposed in 1988, EPA
sought comment on the question of whether land-
fills should simply be prohibited in certain sorts of
hydrogeologic formations because of the inherent
difficulty of monitoring ground water in such forma-
tions. The preamble to the proposed rule stated:
"Some geologic settings that could preclude effec-
tive groundwater monitoring are fractured bedrock
where complex fractures and joint systems impeded
flow direction prediction."27
In response to comments that landfills should
be foreclosed from locating in unmonitorable areas,
EPA said that it agreed. However, rather than adopt-
ing a rule that would have precluded siting a land-
fill above fractured bedrock, EPA sought to deal
with the matter on a case-by-case basis through its
groundwater monitoring requirements. Under the
regulations, a landfill cannot be sited above frac-
tured bedrock, unless the developer can demon-
strate the feasibility of adequate groundwater mon-
itoring. In other words, the burden of proving that
the groundwater monitoring requirements can be
satisfied at the proposed site is on the project pro-
ponent.28 In its comments on the final environmen-
tal impact statement prepared on this project, EPA
Region 9 concluded that Mid-American had not car-
ried that burden of proof.
WHAT ARE DNAPLS,
AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
To illustrate its concerns about the feasibility of
monitoring groundwater in fractured bedrock for
possible contamination, EPA hypothesized that
leachate containing a dense nonaqueous phase liquid or
DNAPL, like the tetrachloroethylene found in clean-
ing solvents, made its way through the land-fill's
two liner and leachate collection systems.
Nonaqueous phase liquids are organic com-
pounds that tend not to mix with water, dissolving
very slowly. A dense nonaqueous phase liquid-
that is, one having a density greater than does water
tends to sink through groundwater. Common dense
nonaqueous phase liquids include chlorinated sol-
vents like tetrachloroethylene-a man-made sub-
stance widely used for dry cleaning fabrics and tex-
tiles and for metal-degreasing operations.
Spot remover containing tetrachloroethylene is
likely to be included in the household waste reaching
the proposed Campo landfill. Tetrachloroethylene is
thought to be capable of causing cancer in humans. 29
Accordingly, health-based standards for maximum
concentrations of DNAPLs in ground water have been
established at five parts per billion. The release of just
sixteen ounces of spot remover containing tetra-
chloroethylene could contaminate twenty-five million
gallons of water to levels unsafe for human consump-
tion.
If a failure of the Campo landfill containment
systems resulted in a release of a DNAPL like tetra-
chloroethylene, a slug of the material would
migrate downward through the unsaturated zone
above the groundwater table and then through the
pore spaces of the weathered bedrock within the
saturated zone. The slug of DNAPL would dissolve
slowly into the groundwater as it penetrated the
saturated zone of the weathered bedrock. The
groundwater contaminated by the dissolving
DNAPL is known as the dissolved phase. The dissolved
phase of the contaminant would be carried along
with the groundwater as it flowed through the
weathered bedrock toward the boundary of the
landfill.
Where groundwater flows through relatively
homogenous, porous rock, such as the weathered
bedrock at the Campo site, a plume of a dissolved-
phase contaminant disperses across a wide volume
of an aquifer. Therefore, the system of wells Mid-
American has designed to monitor the groundwater
flowing through the weathered bedrock should
detect the release of a contaminant that dissolved
sufficiently. However, because DNAPLs dissolve
very slowly, a concentrated slug of tetrachloroethyl-
ene might migrate through the unweathered
bedrock undetected.
Upon reaching the base of the weathered zone,
the slug could drain into any one of the numerous
fractures in the unweathered bedrock, further dis-
solving into the groundwater contained within the
fracture as it continued to migrate downward. In its
comments on the final environmental impact state-
ment, EPA Region 9 expressed serious misgivings
as to whether a slug of DNAPL migrating down such
a fracture would be detected by the system of mon-
itoring wells Mid-American planned to drill into the
unweathered bedrock.
A monitoring well along the landfill boundary
would have to be drilled to a depth of over four
thousand feet, EPA pointed out, to intercept a slug
27. U.S. Environmental.Protection Agency, "Solid Waste
Disposal Facility Critena: Proposed Rule," Federal Register 53,
(1988): 33,314, 33,366.
28. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 'Solid Waste
Disposal Facility Criteria: Final Rule,' Federal Register 56 (1991 ): 50,
978. 51,049.
29. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public
Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, 'Toxicological Profile for Tetrachlorethylene,"
ATSDR/TP-88/22, January 1990.
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of DNAPL seeping down a continuous fracture that
dipped at an angle of sixty degrees. "The footprint of
the facility overlies the traces of approximately 50
such fractures, some greater than 0.5 mile in length.
Because fractures are intercepted by other fractures
at depth, groundwater contaminants would likely
follow an unpredictable path from fracture to frac-
ture beneath the site," EPA noted.30
In explaining his concerns to me. an EPA staff
hydrogeologist used the following illustration:
Detecting the release of a DNAPL in the fractured
bedrock underlying the Campo landfill site "would
require interception of a moving line (the slug)
along a plane (the fracture) by a point (the well). If
one of the numerous fractures were likened [to al
football field inclined below the surface, the chance
of finding the contaminants from the facility bound-
ary with a [monitoring well drilled into the unweath-
ered bedrock] would be similar to successfully
spearing a worm crawling along the fifty-yard line
with a needle from over a distance of four thousand
feet above while wearing a blindfold."
The comments filed by the staff of the California
Integrated Waste Management Board regarding the
final EIS echoed EPA's concerns regarding the mon-
itorability of groundwater in fractured bedrock. "The
proposed composite liner will eventually leak due to
construction flaws, seismic events, and operator
error. This is a reality and an unavoidable event," the
waste board emphasized. The landfill's groundwater
monitoring system, therefore, must be capable of
"detectlingl the escape of pollution quickly and pre-
ventling] its entering the complex fracture aquifer.
[However, wlithout an exact knowledge of the loca-
tion and nature of the fracture zones beneath and
adjacent to the proposed landfill, such a ground-
water monitoring system cannot be properly
designed," the waste board continued. Important
tests performed by Mid-Amencan concerning the
fracture zone were "inconclusive," the waste board
found. "Until the location and nature of the fractured
bedrock system can be accurately described it is not
possible to propose measures that will assure miti-
gation of potential groundwater contamination.
Additional hydrogeologic studies need to be con-
ducted to provide that kind of information," the
waste board concluded. 3'
Mike Connolly believes that the waste board
staff spoke out of turn in making these comments.
He notes that AB 240 gives the State Water
Resources Control Board, not the state waste
board, responsibility for water quality issues arising
under a cooperative agreement between the state
and a tribe concerning a reservation landfill project.
The waste board itself, as distinguished from its
staff, has not addressed the question whether the
site is monitorable. and because of the division of
duties under AB 240, is not expected to. Norhas the
state water board addressed the monitorability
issue, although it may do so when it reviews the
license to operate the Campo landfill, assuming
that the Campo EPA in fact grants such a license to
Mid-American.
DID EPA DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THE CAMPOS?
Mike and the lawyers for the tribe believe that
EPA Region 9 discriminated against the Campos in
the agency's comments on the EIS. Recall that
EPA's regulations do not establish an outright bar
against the siting of landfills above fractured
bedrock. Instead, the regulations provide that each
case is to be decided on its own merits, with the
prolect proponent having the burden of proving that
EPA's groundwater monitoring requirements can be
satisfied at a particular site.
Mike does not quarrel with requiring Mid-
American to prove that its groundwater monitoring
system will satisfy EPA's regulations. He insists that
the Campo EPA will not issue Mid-American a per-
mit to operate the landfill unless the company
makes the required showing. However, Mike feels
that EPA discriminated against the Campo project
by rushing to judgment; that is, by requiring the
tribe and Mid-American to shoulder the burden of
proof prematurely, at the EIS stage.
It would have made more sense, and it would
have been consistent with Region 9's comments in
similar cases, Mike contends, for EPA simply to
have flagged the monitorability issue in its EIS com-
ments, but then suspended judgment until the
Campo EPA acts on Mid-American's application for
permission to operate the landfill. At the EIS stage.
Mike argues, the information available to regula-
tors is necessarily limited; preliminary designs for
the groundwater monitoring system have been pre-
pared and some data is obtainable from test wells.
However, by the time Mid-American applies for the
operating license, the Campo EPA and the federal
and state agencies that review its action will have
much more information upon which to base their
judgments. The actual monitoring well network will
have been completed, and the information devel-
oped in the course of designing, redesigning, and
implementing the monitoring plan will be at hand.
30. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Region 9.
"Comments on the Campo Solid Waste Management Project
Final Environmental Impact Statement," January 4, 1993.
31. California Integrated Waste Management Board.
'Comments on the Campo Solid Waste Management Project
Final Environmental Impact Statement." May 4. 1993.
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Mike supports his charge of bias by pointing to
comments made by EPA Region 9 three months ear-
lier with regard to the EIS prepared on another
landfill project--a proposal by non-Indians to devel-
op a municipal solid waste landfill in an old open-
pit iron ore mine located at Eagle Mountain in
Riverside County, California. Like the Campo site,
the proposed Eagle Mountain landfill is located
above fractured bedrock. Region 9's comments on
the Eagle Mountain EIS noted that "there is insuf-
ficient information to fully assess the feasibility of
full compliance" with EPA's groundwater monitor-
ing requirements. Indeed, Region 9 went on to say
that "it does not appear that groundwater monitor-
ing can be accomplished by methods described in
the EIS." However, rather than treating the EIS as
the definitive document on which the case for mon-
itorability had to stand or fall, as the region would
arguably do later in its comments on the Campo
prolect, Region 9 expressly stated that the deficien-
cies of the Eagle Mountain EIS could be remedied
in the subsequent permitting process. 'The record
of decision, landfill permit application and draft
landfill permit decision should therefore specify
how a groundwater monitoring program will be
implemented to meet the requirements" of EPA's
regulations.3 2
At the time, I was aware that the Campos were
charging Region 9 with bias and that they cited the
Eagle Mountain comments in support of their accu-
sation, but I failed to understand the precise char-
acter of their grievance. I thought that the crux of
the Campos' complaint was that Region 9 had
raised concerns regarding the monitorability of
groundwater in fractured bedrock in its comments
on the Campo EIS, while remaining silent on the
point in its comments on the Eagle Mountain EIS. I
obtained a copy of the region's Eagle Mountain
comments, satisfied myself that we had raised the
monitorability issue there, too, and concluded after
discussion with my staff that the charge of bias was
groundless. One of the major responsibilities of the
regional administrator, I believe, is protecting the
staff from intimidation. Region 9 had not pulled its
punches in EIS comments when wealthy developers
invoked their friends in high places, and we were
not going to do so in response to what seemed to
me to be a baseless charge of racial bias.
I now understand that Mike's real complaint
was that EPA's comments on the EIS seemed to
betray a lack of confidence in the Campo EPA to do
the right thing when it acted on the landfill permit
applications. In the Eagle Mountain case, EPA had
identified the monitorability issue in its EIS com-
ments but had then deferred to the state waste and
water boards, trusting those agencies to apply
EPA's groundwater monitoring regulations appro-
priately when they eventually ruled on the permit.
No such deference, it seemed to Mike, had been
accorded to the Campo EPA. To the contrary, EPA
seemed to him to have taken pains to imply that the
site could not properly be found to be monitorable,
usurping the role of the Campo EPA, and doing so
long before all the evidence on monitorability was
in. The untimely and unwarranted conclusion
allegedly implied in Region 9's EIS comments will
haunt the Campo project, Mike predicts, because
Donna Tisdale will rely heavily upon it in the RCRA
citizen suit she will surely file if the Campo EPA ulti-
mately decides that Mid- American has carried its
burden of proof on monitorability and should be
issued a permit to operate.
What I failed to understand at the time was that
Mike was not accusing'Region 9 of conventional
racial discrimination. He did'not think that we were
biased against Indians in the sense of intentionally
denying them equal protection of the laws we were
responsible for administering. He was accusing us
of paternalism, of assuming that we had to protect
the Campos from themselves. And, paternalism, the
complacent conviction that we know what is best for
others, Mike reminds us, inspired some of the worst
sins that whites have committed against the
Indians--robbing them of their culture, their reli-
gion, and even of their children.
I can speak only for myself, but I suspect there
may be an element of truth in the accusation of
paternalism, at least in the sense that I had not
developed much confidence in Mike or the Campo
EPA by the time Region 9 commented on the EIS.
On the other hand, I did have great confidence In
the Navalo EPA, for example. Were there significant
differences between the two tribes and their envi-
ronmental protection programs that justified differ-
ent degrees of confidence in their ability and com-
mitment to implement federal environmental laws?
The Navaio nation has a population of over two
hundred thousand and a land base the size of West
Virginia. The Campo tribe has some three hundred
members, and a much smaller reservation--about
fifteen thousand acres. The Navajos have had an
environmental protection agency since l072; the
Campo EPA was created in 1990. The program
offices of the Navajo EPA largely mirror those of
32. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9,
"Comments on Eagle Mountain Landfill Project Final EIS,"
September 8, 1992.
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EPA Region 9, covering a broad range of environ-
mental concerns--for example, air quality, water
quality, pesticides, solid waste and hazardous
waste permitting programs, and hazardous waste
cleanups. Although it has a broad mandate and has
now taken significant steps to assume other
responsibilities, the Campo EPA did not then have
much of a track record and its primary mission was
to regulate the proposed landfill.
The director of the Navajo EPA had an outstand-
ing career with the federal EPA before she joined the
tribal government. Mike was an aerospace engineer
until he became the chairman of the Campo EPA in
1990. The Navajo EPA director's role within the tribal
government has always been clear. She is a regulator,
not a proponent of the tribe's business interests. I
have since learned that Mike was doing his very best
to draw the same bright line and to stay on the side
reserved for regulators, but his role seemed ambigu-
ous to me at the time. When reporters asked the tribe
to comment on the latest accusation made by
Assemblyman Steve Peace, Supervisor Dianne Jacob,
or Donna Tisdale, the Campo answering the charges
was likely to be Mike, not Ralph Goff, Ralph had
largely abandoned his role as the tribe's public
spokesman for the project, having despaired of get-
ting a fair hearing in the press.
I am not drawing these distinctions in order to
belittle the smaller tribes, or to suggest that they
are inherently incapable of assuming responsibility
for implementing some or all of the federal environ-
mental protection programs. I am suggesting that it
is fair to inquire whether a particular tribal program
has the critical mass, resources, trained personnel,
and track record to merit confidence. To fail to dis-
tinguish among tribal programs on such grounds
would be, it seems to me, an indefensible lack of
discrimination. The Campos have demonstrated
that it is possible for a small tribe with sufficient
resources and resolve to develop a landfill regulato-
ry system that a very tough critic, the State of
California, has come to recognize as at least as pro-
tective as its own. Moreover, as we shall see in
chapter ten, EPA later tentatively approved the
Campo Environmental Protection Agency's landfill
regulatory program as meeting or exceeding federal
environmental standards. The system worked; it
gave the Campo EPA an opportunity to be judged
on its own merits.
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR'S DECISION
The decision whether to approve the lease of
the Campo site to Mid-American was elevated to
the Secretary of Interior himself. The leaders of both
BAD and the Campo tribe met with Secretary of
Interior Manuel LuIan. BAD's meeting was arranged
by Congressman Duncan Hunter. Awarded the
Bronze Star for participating in twenty-five heli-
copter assaults in Viet Nam. Hunter was first elect-
ed to the House in 1980 in the Reagan landslide. A
leader of the Conservative Opportunity Society.
founded by Georgia Republican Newt Gingrich.
Hunter was elected chairman of the House
Republican Research Committee-the fifth-highest
GOP position-in 1989. Hunter has an unusual back-
ground for a conservative Republican. For three
years before being elected to Congress. he lived and
worked in the Hispanic section of San Diego.
Running his own storefront law office, Hunter often
gave free legal advice to poor people. When
President Reagan called for abolition of the Legal
Services Corporation, Hunter was one of the dis-
senters.
3
Donna Tisdale says that Secretary Lujan repeat-
edly assured her and Congressman Hunter that the
Campo project would not be approved. According
to Donna, after she met with the secretary in
Washington, Lujan pulled Congressman Hunter
aside and said, "Tell your people not to worry, the
project isn't going to happen." Donna was also
encouraged by a secondhand report of a meeting
that Lulan had with proponents of the project. One
of Congressman Hunter's staff members told Donna
that a BIA official who had been present at that
meeting had told the staffer that Lujan had said
that he would not approve the project, that it was
not environmentally sound. On the other hand,
Mike Connolly says that when the Campos met with
Secretary Lujan, they did not get the impression
that he was opposed to the project. However, when
the Secretary came to California to speak at a
fundraiser for Congressman Hunter, Donna met
with him one-on-one for ten or fifteen minutes.
Lulan told her. "Relax. This is wrong, and it's not
going to happen." 34
As it turned out, Secretary Lujan did not act on
the Campo project before leaving office, because
the period for public comment on the final environ-
mental impact statement did not close until just
two weeks before the inauguration of President
Clinton. Congressman Hunter, Donna says, tried to
get the Secretary to write a memo to the incoming
administration, putting it on guard concerning the
project, but Lujan refused.3 5 Two days after the
Clinton Administration took office, Congressman
Hunter wrote Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt,
33. Phil Duncan, ed.. Politics in Amenra, 1991. 227-29.
34. Donna Tisdale. interviews by author. May 7 and October
9. 1993: Michael Connally. Interviex by author. June 13. 1993.
35. Donna Tlsdale, Interview by author. October 9. 1993.
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advising him of "serious flaws" in the Campo pro-
ject, principally the threat of groundwater contami-
nation. Hunter later said that he had received assur-
ances from Interior Department officials that
Babbitt himself would make the final decision
whether to approve the landfill lease. "I will contin-
ue to press this issue with the new Administration,"
Hunter vowed. "This is a life or death situation for
the individuals living near the reservation, and I'm
confident Secretary Babbitt will be willing to listen
to our arguments." 36
Donna met Secretary Babbitt on March 17.
1993. The meeting was to have been on March 26,
but Congressman Hunter's office told her that
Babbitt was expected to act on the project on the
nineteenth, so the meeting had been moved up to
the seventeenth. The last-minute change of plans
meant that Donna had to exchange her $500 round
trip ticket to Washington for one costing $1,200.
At the meeting, Donna was accompanied by
Congressman Hunter and Hunter's chief of staff;
Secretary Babbitt had no staff with him. The meet-
ing lasted half an hour. Babbitt seemed to be
unaware of the arguments against the project--for
example, the dependency of the Campo region on
ground water, and EPA's comments concerning the
monitorability of groundwater in fractured bedrock.
Indeed, Babbitt seemed to Donna to be "genuinely
shocked" by the information she brought to his
attention. At the conclusion of the meeting, Donna
had the sense that she had received a fair hearing,
and that Babbitt was "sincere." Expected to act by
March 19, Secretary Babbitt did not announce his
decision until April 27, leading Donna to believe
that he did look into the issues she raised with
him. 37
According to Mike Connolly. when the Campos
met with the Secretary, Babbitt asked Chairman
Ralph Goff several questions: How long had he
been in office? (Nine years.) When was he last
reelected? (April 1991.) What was his margin of vic-
tory" (Ninety-eight percent.) Was the tribe still be
hind the project? (Yes, the most recent referenda
were unanimous.) 38
On April 27, 1993. Secretary Bruce Babbitt
approved the lease of the landfill site to Mid-
American. "The Campos' substantial efforts over
many years, encouraged by the prior Administration,
and my conclusion that the project has almost uni-
versal support among tribal members were impor-
tant factors in my decision," the Secretary said.39
Secretary Babbitt's statement struck Donna Tisdale
as disingenuous insofar as it referred to the prior
administration's encouragement of the project,
because Secretary Lujan had assured her of his
opposition to it. To Donna, Babbitt "sounded like he
was making excuses for saying yes."4 0
Secretary Babbitt took the opportunity present-
ed by the Campo case to announce significant new
policy guidelines that are to govern the Department
of Interior's exercise of its trust responsibilities con-
cerning proposals to develop commercial waste
projects on Indian reservations during his tenure.
Indeed, the Interior Department's press release
announcing the Secretary's decision in the Campo
case emphasized that "it would be a mistake for the
waste disposal industry to look upon the decision
as encouraging the targeting of Indian lands for
dumps for non-Indian waste."41 For the moment we
will concentrate on Secretary Babbitt's decision in
this case, before returning in chapter twelve to the
broader policy guide lines he announced.
Secretary Babbitt's formal act was approving a
document called the record of decision (ROD) prepared
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In the record of deci-
sion. the BIA concluded that, despite the fractured
bedrock, the groundwater passing beneath the
landfill could be adequately monitored for contam-
ination. The BIA was satisfied that, given the avail-
able information concerning the direction in which
the groundwater flows within both the unweathered
and weathered bedrock, "monitoring well networks
can be targeted to encounter fractures such that
representative groundwater samples can be collect-
ed." Additional engineering studies would be
required, the BIA noted, to define the orientation of
the fractures more fully and to determine where the
monitoring wells should be located. The fractured
character of the unweathered bedrock, the BIA rec-
ognized, requires "many more monitoring wells
than typically found at other solid waste landfill
sites."
The detailed design of such a system of moni-
toring wells is, the BIA contended, "beyond the
scope of the NEPA process," and would be reviewed
by the Campo EPA prior to the installation of the
36. Mm. Empire Press, Babbitt to Make Final Decision on36. Mtn. Empire Press, "Babbitt to Make Final Decision on
Proposed Indian Waste Facility.' March 1993.
37. Donna Tisdale, Interviews by author, May 7 and October
9, 1993.
38. Michael Connolly, Interview by author, june 13, 1993.
39. U.S. Department of Interior. 'Secretary Babbitt Approves
Campo Landfill Lease, Sets Tough Guidelines for New Indian
Waste Facility Proposals," press release, April 27, 1993,
40. Donna Tisdale, Interviews by author. May 7 and
September 14, 1993.
4 1. U.S. Department of Interior, "Secretary Babbitt Approves
Campo Landfill Lease, Sets Tough Guidelines for New Indian
Waste Facility Proposals."
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wells and prior to excavation of the first phase of
the landfill. However, the BIA continued, the record
of decision "does identify the general requirements
of such an engineered system." Moreover, the BIA
said that it would review the monitoring plan when
it was prepared, "pursuant to its trust responsibility
to ensure protection of human health."42
Secretary Babbitt's decision was denounced by
a chorus of federal, state, and local elected officials
representing the Campo area. 'This process is far
from over," said Congressman Hunter. "With the
health risk that this dump poses to the reservation
and the surrounding communities, we simply can't
give up this fight."43 Jan Goldsmith, who has repre-
sented the Campo vicinity in the California
Assembly since the area was redistricted, character-
ized Babbitt's decision as "outrageous." "Anything I
can do at the state level, I will do," Goldsmith
pledged. The most outspoken official was San Diego
County Supervisor Dianne Jacob, who suggested
that campaign contributions might explain why
Secretary Babbitt's decision was announced just
before the California waste board was due to act on
the project. 'That was no coincidence. It was obvi-
ous to me that they had the political skids greased,"
Supervisor Jacob charged. "This is not over," Jacob
added. "rhe Board of Supervisors will meet on this
issue in closed session to .discuss legal action,"
Jacob said, including the possibility of suing
Secretary Babbitt.44
THE COUNTY TAKES SECRETARY BABBITT
TO COURT
Following Secretary Babbitt's approval of the
lease to Mid-American, the County of San Diego
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the
federal district court in San Diego to enjoin the
Department of Interior and the Campo tribe from
issuing any additional leases or permits, or engag-
ing in any other activities in furtherance of the con-
struction of the landfill. The county claimed that the
environmental impact statement prepared by BIA
did not satisfy the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act, principally because it
failed to analyze adequately the possibility of
groundwater contamination.
42. U.S. Department of Intenor. Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Sacramento Area Office. Campo Solid Wasle Management Pplect.
Record of Decision. FES 92-29, April 27. 1993.
43. Duncan Hunter. 'Hunter Says Fight Against Campo
Landfill.Will Continue. 'press release. April 28. 1993.
44. Billie lo Shepherd. 'Opponents Say Fight Against
Landfill Will Continue." Alpine (Calif.) Sun. May 5. 1993.
45. Half Moon Bay Fishernans Marketing v. Carlucc, 857 F.2d
505. 507 (9th Cir. 1988).
A preliminary injunction is intended to main-
tain the status quo until the court has the opportu-
nity to consider the merits of a case more fully.
Federal courts in California employ a two-pronged
test in determining whether to grant such extraordi-
nary relief. To make the case for a preliminary
injunction, the moving party must demonstrate
either: (I) a combination of probable success when the
merits of the matter are considered in a subsequent
hearing, and the possibility of irreparable injury if the
preliminary injunction is not granted in the interim;
or (2) that serious questions are raised and the bal-
ance of hardsfiips tips in the moving party's favor 45
These formulations are not considered to be sepa-
rate tests, but rather the opposite ends of a single
continuum.46 In essence, the standard for granting a
preliminary injunction is a sliding scale: as the
probability of success on the merits decreases, the
required degree of irreparable harm increases.47
The Department of Interior and the Campo
tribe scored a lopsided victory over the county and
its silent partner, BAD. The court denied the prelim-
inary injunction on the following grounds: "First. it
does not appear likely that the County will succeed
on the merits, as the BIA's action seems to have
adequately considered the EIS, which appears rea-
sonably thorough. Second, the County has failed to
show a possibility of irreparable injury. Third, the
balance of hardships tips in the Tribe's favor.
Finally, the public interest seems best served by
permitting the Campo Band to proceed with the
project."4B
In determining the likelihood of the county's
prevailing on the merits, the court was guided by
the standard of judicial review applicable to cases
involving the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). NEPA is, as discussed earlier, essentially a
procedural statute 49 That is, NEPA itself does not
mandate particular results, but simply prescribes
the process that a federal agency proposing a major
project must follow. Accordingly, if the environmen-
tal impact statement adequately identifies and
evaluates the adverse environmental consequences
of the proposed action, the agency-which is not
constrained by NEPA from deciding that other val-
ues outweigh the environmental costs-may decide
46. Beda v. Grand Ldgz ci Intnainal Ascctibfn of Marhfnits
etc.. 584 F.2d 303, 315 (9th Or. 1978).
47. Unild Siatts v. Od sa Unbn Wardiouse Co-cp, 833 F.2d 172,
174 (9th COr. 1987).
48. Counly cl San Dg. v. Babbiltt. Order Denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 93-G936-IEG (LSP) (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 15, 1993). 6. (Hereafter cited as Order. San DMgo v. Bo5Eilt.
Isicl)
49. Oregm Emntirnmrntal Counril v. Kunzrnan. 817 F.2d 484,492
19th Cir. 1987).
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to proceed with the project. 50 In other words, if an
agency has taken a hard lookat the likely environ-
mental consequences of its proposed action, its
decision must not be disturbed by the courts.5"
The court ruled that the BIA did appear to have
taken the requisite "hard look" at the likely environ-
mental consequences of approving the landfill
lease. "It has issued a lengthy and detailed
Environmental Impact Statement, which complies
with NEPA's requirements of a fairly detailed analy-
sis of environmental effects and alternatives."
Specifically, the County's greatest concern--the pos-
sibility of groundwater contamination--"appears to
have been a particular concern of the BIA as well,
and the measures designed to prevent groundwater
contamination are discussed in full in the EIS." The
court noted that a landfill of the Campo double-
liner design appeared to be significantly less likely
to fail than one meeting minimum federal stan-
dards. With regard to the question of monitorabili-
ty of groundwater in fractured bedrock, the court
concluded that "the EIS and ROD indicate that IBIA]
has seriously examined the question of site moni-
torability." 2
Turning to the other factors to be considered in
determining whether to grant a preliminary injunc-
tion, the court held that the county had not shown
a real possibility of irreparable damage. The EIS was
adequate in itself and more detailed groundwater
monitoring studies would be required by the
Campo EPA before Mid-American would be granted
a permit to operate the landfill. Moreover, the court
noted, the BIAs record of decision was conditioned
upon the completion, review, and approval of the
groundwater monitoring plan. "If the required fur-
ther studies indicate that the project poses serious
environmental risks, the BIA and the Campo Band
may still halt the Project, as the Court assumes they
would do if the landfill threatened the tribe's water
supply." 3
By contrast, the court held, the potential of
harm to the Campos was "concrete and immediate"
if an injunction were to be granted. "Delay in the
construction of the Project will deprive the Campo
Band of much-needed revenue and employment. As
the Tribe also points out, delay of the project may
jeopardize negotiations with potential customers of
the landfill. Further, the costs of the project could
increase substantially." Such factors, the court
noted, are commonly considered when deciding
whether to grant an injunction halting construction
of a project.54
Finally, the court held, a preliminary injunction
did not appear to be in the public interest. "Rather,
halting construction would harm the public interest
in Indian sovereignty and economic security. In
addition, there is public benefit to increasing land-
fill capacity, as well as providing a competitive
alternative to the County's waste management sys-
tem.""
The denial of the county's motion for a prelim-
mary injunction came as no surprise to anyone
familiar with either the showing required to support
such a motion or the standard of review applicable
to cases involving the National Environmental
Policy Act. Indeed, even before the court ruled, Mike
Connolly said that he thought the county was "just
going through the motions, so that [Supervisorj
Dianne Jacob can come back to Donna and say,
'Well, I tried everything I could.'...It's kind of a
shame," Mike continued. "I don't think Donna is
politically sophisticated enough to really see when
they're kind of stringing her along, these politicians,
just doing enough to mollify her. We saw that with
Duncan Hunter and Steve Peace, too, at various
times." For example, Mike said, "I heard Steve Peace
say at various times that he was going to stop the
landfill, and then after the cooperative agreement
was negotiated, then all of a sudden his position
was, 'Why, I never said I was going to stop the land-
fill. I just said I would make sure that it was regulat-
ed as stringently as California's." '56
The defendants--the Campos and the
Department of Interior--followed up on their victory
by asking the court to render summary judgment In
their favor, a procedure for deciding a case on the
written pleadings without conducting a trial. After
she attended the hearing on the motions for sum-
mary judgment, Donna permitted herself to hope
again. "I think the judge is seeing things from our
side now," she said. "I was shocked." The outlook
had changed, Donna was convinced, because the
judge seemed finally to have focused on the fact
that the aquifer at risk is the sole source of the
region's drinking water. "So it's looking good for us,"
she concluded.
A judge's remarks at oral argument, Donna was
cautioned, are a notoriously unreliable indicator of
the eventual ruling- the judge may be playing the
devil's advocate simply to test the strength of var-
50. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 346,
350 (1989).
51. Kieppe v. Sierra Club. 427 U.S. 390. 410 n.21 (1976).
52. Order, San Diego v. Babbitt, 6-7. 9-10.
53. Order, San Diego v. Babbitt, 9, 13-14.
54. Order, San Diego v. Babbitt, 13-14.
55. Order, San Diego v. Babbitt, 14.
56. Michael Connolly, Interview by author, October 12, 1993.
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ous positions. However, Donna was convinced that
the judge had tipped her hand. The judge had made
"some pretty strong statements, and by the looks on
'the lopposing attorneys'l faces, whew! Even the
reporter for the Union told me as he left [the court-
room], 'Well, it looks like the winds have shifted
here.' It wasn't just me," Donna insisted.57
Donna was, she would say later, optimistic for a
whole week. Her hopes were then dashed; the
defendants' motions for summary judgment were
granted. Summary judgment is appropriate when
the record reveals no disputed issues of niatenal fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. There certainly are disputed issues of
fact in this case, most notably whether the landfill
poses an unacceptable risk to the area's water sup-
ply. However, the disputed issues of fact, the judge
held, were not material to the narrow .question a
court may consider in reviewing an environmental
impact statement--whether the agency took the req-
uisite "hard look" at the likely environmental conse-
quences of its proposed action. The fact that the
aquifer underlying the proposed land fill is the sole
source of the area's drinking water was, the court
observed the premise underlying most of the analy-
sis in the EIS. Moreover, it is well established that
in determining whether an agency has complied
with "NEPA, the court is not to resolve a conflict
between scientific experts.5 8
A federal district court's scope of review of
agency action is limited; essentially, it may only set
aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."59 The court found that NEPA's require-
ments were satisfied here. "Specifically, the EIS pro-
vides sufficient detail to inform the decisionmakers
of the environmental impact of the Project. The
BIA's approval of the Project was neither 'arbitrary
or capricious,' nor undertaken 'without observance
of procedure required by law."60
Donna has the character trait coaches admire
most-she does not seem have any "quit" in her. Her
reaction to the order granting summary judgment
was simply to rally her troops one more time to
lobby the county Board of Supervisors to appeal the
judge's order. Steve Peace and two other state sen-
ators provided letters of support, Congressman
Duncan Hunter manned the phones, and Dianne
57. Donna Tisdale. interview by author, January 20. 1994.
58. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Schultze. 992 F.2d 977.
981 (9th Cir. 1993).
59. Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.CA. Sec. 706(2)(A).
60. County of San Diego v. Babbitt. Order Granting Motions for
Summary judgment, 93-0986-IEG (LSP) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27). 16-17.
Jacob led the fight from within the Board of
Supervisors.61 On March 14. 1994. the county filed
its notice of appeal.
Though others may admire her for it, Donna's
refusal to admit defeat dismays Mike. "There's been
this pattern: She'll make these accusations. They
turn out to be unfounded. But it doesn't seem to
change any attitudes." For example, the Campos
were alleged to be dupes of the landfill developer,
who was said to be seeking a haven from stringent
state standards. However. when the dust settled,
the state itself concluded that the standards adopt-
ed by the Campos for the design, construction, and
operation of their landfill are at least as protective
as California's. "I think that what we're dealing with
here is a case of people believing what they want to
believe. It doesn't really matter what you say." Mike
laments. "You're just beating your head against the
wall trying to get it across to them. But it's my job
to try to get it across to them; I've got to do it any-
way. I guess I've just got to put shock absorbers on
my skull and keep plugging away."62
Donna's attitude was perhaps best captured by
a statement she made following Secretary Babbitts
decision. She was undaunted, she insisted, as were
other members of BAD. "Out of countless neighbors
I've talked to, not one has expressed a defeatist atti-
tude." She pointed out that other hurdles, regulato-
ry and financial, remained for the project. "They
have a helluva long row to hoe, and we will be dog-
ging each and every step they take."63
61. Donna Tisdale. Interew by author. February 7. 1994.
62. Michael Connolly, Intervie by author. February 7. 1994.
63. Billie Jo Shepherd. "Opponents Say Fight Against
Landfill Vill Continue.
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